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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND
U.S. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN NATIONALS
Jennifer K. Elsea*
The due process rights of suspected terrorists have played a major role
in the debate about how best to engage terrorist entities after September 11,
2001. Does citizenship or immigration status have a bearing on the
treatment of terrorists? Does location within or outside the United States
matter? This Article explores the connection between citizenship and
alienage, enemy status, allegiance, and due process rights against a
backdrop of international law. It surveys the application of due process to
citizens and aliens based on the location of misconduct within or outside
the territory of the United States and notes the expansion of criminal law to
cover ever more extraterritorial conduct, including that of noncitizens who
otherwise have no connection to the United States. It concludes by
suggesting that the fairness of a particular exercise of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction might be determined by looking at the nature of the
obligation that a defendant owes to the state based on international law.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates about the optimal approach to defeating terrorist organizations
after September 11, 2001, have included some elements of discord
regarding the rights of suspected terrorists—aliens as well as citizens—both
inside the United States and abroad. This Article explores the connection
between citizenship and alienage, enemy status, allegiance, and due process
rights. It surveys the application of due process to citizens and aliens based
on the location of misconduct within or outside the territory of the United
States and notes the expansion of criminal law to cover ever more
extraterritorial conduct, including that of noncitizens who otherwise have
no connection to the United States. Historically, citizenship has been
thought of as the relationship of an individual to a sovereign government,
encompassing the obligations of each to the other. The citizen enjoyed the
protection of the government and its laws in return for his allegiance and
obedience to the laws. The relationship between the state and aliens, on the
other hand, was defined more in terms of obligations between the state and
the alien’s home state.
Citizenship (or nationality) was once seen as the essential link between
individuals and the law of nations, because states—rather than
individuals—were considered the subjects of international law, and it was
only through the individual’s relationship to a state that he could enjoy any
benefits under the law of nations.1 Statelessness was considered a
substantial encumbrance; stateless individuals were essentially at the mercy
of all states in whose territories they might find themselves, without the
ability to call on the protection of a home state to obtain redress.
The intertwined concepts of allegiance and protection were not, however,
limited to citizens; there was also a territorial element stemming from the
basic international rule that a state generally has the exclusive authority to
regulate conduct in its territory. Although they continued to owe allegiance
to the native state, aliens in the territory of a host state owed “local
allegiance” to the sovereign in return for the temporary protection of the
laws of the land. If the state on whose territory the alien resided denied him
equal protection of the law, technically it would be in breach of its
obligations toward the alien’s state of nationality rather than toward the
alien himself. As a practical matter, aliens could enjoy equal protection of
the host state’s laws, making it potentially difficult to distinguish aliens
from citizens in terms of rights they enjoyed or obligations they owed. Of
course, there was never any requirement under international law that aliens
enjoy all of the privileges of citizens, such as the right to participate in
government, for example. International law may have been indifferent to
the privileges that citizens and other categories of nationals enjoyed under
domestic law, but it did operate to protect aliens from unfair treatment at the
hands of local officials.2

1. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
2. Id. § 293.
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This Article traces the historical incorporation of these international law
concepts into domestic law, beginning with the development of due process
for aliens of various classes in U.S. territory. It then addresses the effect of
war on the relationship of individuals to the United States, followed by a
discussion of the development of due process rights extraterritorially.
Finally, it surveys the expansion of U.S. criminal law to cover
extraterritorial conduct.
I. DUE PROCESS FOR ALIENS ON U.S. TERRITORY
That aliens in U.S. territory enjoy the protection of U.S. law is well
established. There was considerable discussion on the subject during the
crisis and the Quasi-War involving the French Republic at the end of the
eighteenth century.3 During the summer of 1798, Congress enacted a series
of national security measures known collectively as the Alien and Sedition
Acts,4 which included the Alien Act5 and the Sedition Act,6 as well as the
Alien Enemy Act.7
The Alien Act empowered the president to deport any noncitizen whom
he judged to be “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States” or
suspected to be engaged in any “treasonable or secret machinations” against
the government.8 Expelled aliens convicted of having returned to the
United States without a license were subject to imprisonment for such time
as the president deemed necessary for the public safety.9 Outside of such a
conviction, the Act did not permit summary detention, but the law was
nonetheless controversial. Part of the debate surrounding the Alien Act
questioned the extent to which the Bill of Rights covers “alien friends” on
U.S. territory. Opponents argued that such aliens within the United States
are entitled to due process of law and the same protection from the
government as citizens. Therefore, aliens suspected of being disposed to
engage in plots to overthrow the social order or to take part in other
insurrectionist activities10 should be tried in court rather than summarily
deported.11 Proponents argued that aliens within the United States owed
3. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 52–54 (1996).
4. Congress also amended the Naturalization Act to extend the residency requirement
from five to fourteen years. Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802). For
the text of the Alien and Sedition Acts and historical papers documenting the debates
surrounding their passage, see Alien and Sedition Acts, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html.
5. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800).
6. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801).
7. Alien Enemy Act, ch. 67, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 21–24 (2006)).
8. Alien Act § 1, 1 Stat. at 571.
9. Id. § 2.
10. For a description of rumored plots that were cited in support of the legislation, see
JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 61–62 (1951).
11. The bill did not address preventive detention, except on conviction of returning
without permission. Some opponents of the bill nevertheless warned that its passage would
inevitably lead to similar treatment of citizens who were suspected of being dangerous to
national security. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980–82 (1798).
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merely temporary allegiance to the United States and were therefore not
entitled to the same rights as citizens, and that all governments have the
right to deport aliens who pose a danger.12 The bill passed along regional
lines,13 but was never enforced, although some aliens left the country under
their own volition.14 The Alien Act expired in 1800.
The view that aliens on U.S. territory owe only a temporary allegiance to
the United States, but nevertheless enjoy equal protection of the laws,
appears to have prevailed. That “persons” under the Fifth Amendment15
includes citizens and aliens within the United States is well settled.16 While
courts have sometimes suggested that only aliens with lawful permanent
residence status are entitled to due process protection,17 the Supreme Court
has in fact found that the Due Process Clause extends to all aliens within
the United States, even those whose presence is “unlawful, involuntary, or
transitory.”18 The level of process that is due varies according to the

12. See, e.g., 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533, 534 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836)
(response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the Virginia Resolutions) (declaring the
Alien and Sedition Acts to be constitutional and “expedient and necessary,” and asserting
that the Alien Act “respects a description of persons whose rights were not particularly
contemplated in the Constitution of the United States, who are entitled only to a temporary
protection while they yield a temporary allegiance—a protection which ought to be
withdrawn whenever they become ‘dangerous to the public safety’”).
13. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 53 (noting that support for the legislation came mainly
from northern states). Virginia and Kentucky passed resolutions declaring the Alien Act and
the Sedition Act to be unconstitutional. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at 528 (response of James
Madison to the Virginia Resolutions of 1798); id. at 540–41 (Thomas Jefferson’s original
draft of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799).
14. MILLER, supra note 10, at 188.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
16. See generally 2 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 24:8 (3d ed.
2013) (describing protection as it applies to aliens).
17. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (“It is well
established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains
physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.”); see
also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (explaining the view that
constitutional rights extending to all “persons” or the “accused” apply universally to persons
under U.S. jurisdiction, but other protections applicable to “the people” apply only to those
who have developed significant ties to the United States).
18. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien enters the country,
the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding
that no executive officer may “arbitrarily . . . cause an alien, who has entered the country,
and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population,
although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving
him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the
United States”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that aliens may
not be incarcerated as punishment for immigration violations without regular criminal
process).
THE
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substantive right for which protection is sought, however, and such rights
may vary according to citizenship and immigration status.19
Aliens who have not acquired any domicile or residence in the United
States are generally entitled to very little process to determine whether they
should be permitted to enter the country.20 Although covered by the Due
Process Clause, an alien seeking entry at a port of arrival is not
constitutionally entitled to a judicial hearing, even if claiming to be a U.S.
citizen.21 The distinction between due process protections accorded to
“deportable,” compared to “excludable” aliens, for purposes of removal
hearings, has thus traditionally been stark.22 Under the “entry fiction,”
excludable (now called “inadmissible”) aliens are deemed to be standing at
the border of U.S. territory,23 even if they have been paroled into the
country24 or have previously been admitted to the United States and lived
there many years.25 Deportable aliens are those who have entered the
country but have become ineligible to remain.26 The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that excludable aliens seeking entry into the United States are not
entitled to the same due process prior to being removed that applies to
aliens who have achieved entry.27 Whatever process Congress sees fit to

19. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78 (“The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are
protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are
entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens
must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally
hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 722 (1987) (finding that aliens in the United States are entitled to
due process of law and equal protection under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, although
reasonable distinctions may be made between citizens and aliens).
20. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (upholding longterm detention of aliens on Ellis Island seeking admission into the country); United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding that aliens outside the country
seeking admission are entitled to only that process determined by Congress to be due).
21. See generally United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
22. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 24–25 (1982) (explaining that U.S. immigration
laws created two types of proceedings in which aliens could be removed from this country:
deportation hearings for aliens who had entered the country and exclusion hearings for those
seeking initial admission into the United States). Aliens subject to deportation generally
were granted greater substantive rights than excludable aliens. Id. The Illegal Immigrant
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) changed the rules governing
removal hearings. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
23. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court concluded that the indefinite detention of
deportable aliens would raise significant due process concerns, while distinguishing the case
from one in which an excludable alien is subject to detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
The Court interpreted a statute governing the removal of deportable and inadmissible aliens
as only permitting the detention of aliens following an order of removal for so long as is
“reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Id.
24. Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
excludable aliens may be subject to indefinite detention if their removal cannot be
effectuated).
25. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213.
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012).
27. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
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provide to excludable aliens satisfies the Due Process Clause.28 It bears
emphasis that it is Congress’s authority to admit aliens or exclude them, and
the alien’s lack of a substantive right to be present in the United States, that
brings about this distinction. An excludable alien nevertheless has other
life, liberty, or property interests with respect to which he would likely be
accorded at least some due process.29 Further, he certainly could not be
punished without the full benefits of a criminal trial.30
II. WARTIME TREATMENT OF CITIZENS AND ALIENS
During periods of war, the obligations of individuals to their states of
nationality take on greater importance. Aliens acquire further status
distinctions—that of alien friend or enemy, as well as civilian versus
combatant.
A. Enemy Aliens
The greatest historical distinction in terms of due process among citizens
and classes of aliens in the United States arises in the context of war, in the
treatment of enemy aliens—that is, citizens of a country with which the
United States is at war.31 The Alien Enemy Act, unlike the Alien Act,
engendered no disagreement in Congress when it was first enacted, and it is
the only one of the Alien and Sedition Acts that remains on the books,
practically unchanged. The law of war permits the internment of enemy
civilians and combatants and the confiscation of their property, regardless
of whether the alien demonstrated any actual hostility. Allegiance to the
home country is simply presumed and, therefore, such detentions or
confiscations serve the wartime aim of disabling the enemy.32 This rule has

28. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); United States
v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
29. Cf. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The ‘entry fiction’
that excludable aliens are to be treated as if detained at the border despite their physical
presence in the United States determines the aliens’ rights with regard to immigration and
deportation proceedings. It does not limit the right of excludable aliens detained within
United States territory to humane treatment.”). Arriving and excludable aliens are protected
at least against conduct that “shocks the conscience.” See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238
F.3d 704, 731 (6th Cir. 2001) (dictum) (“[I]t would indeed shock the conscience to permit
the INS to shoot or to torture a person seeking entry into the United States . . . .”), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Thomas v. Rosales-Garcia, 534 U.S. 1063 (2001); Wang v. Reno, 81
F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that an alien paroled into the United States was included
under the Fifth Amendment and protected from government conduct that “shock[s] the
conscience”); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1272 (D. Utah
2003) (holding that, even in the absence of Fourth Amendment restraints on law enforcement
officers, previously removed alien felons will have protections against abusive police
actions).
30. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
31. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006).
32. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772–73 (1950) (“The alien enemy is
bound by an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of
our enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards
him as part of the enemy resources. It therefore takes measures to disable him from
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been ameliorated somewhat by treaty; alien enemies are to be given
adequate time to depart the country upon the outbreak of war.
International law formerly denied enemy aliens judicial standing,
preventing their access to the courts.33 Although this is no longer the
case,34 enemy aliens present in the United States may be interned35 or
deprived of property by summary administrative proceeding.36 Interned
aliens are entitled to contest their status as enemy aliens by means of habeas
corpus.37 The Supreme Court found that an enemy alien may be deported
without the ordinary due process accorded to noncitizens in deportation
proceedings in the United States, even after hostilities have ended.38 In
contrast, while the Supreme Court effectively permitted the wartime
internment of U.S. citizens based on their Japanese descent,39 it also held
that a concededly loyal U.S. citizen could not be detained in a relocation
camp, which suggests that due process must be provided in order to permit
such a detainee to contest disloyalty.40
B. Wartime Obligations of Citizens and Inhabitants
War also affects the obligations of citizens and inhabitants, and not just
by levying extra taxes or imposing conscription. Belligerents have
traditionally imposed on those under their jurisdiction the obligation to
refrain from trade with enemy countries and persons, no matter how benign
any particular transaction may seem. Transactions intended to assist the
enemy could expose those owing allegiance to the sovereign (even
temporarily) to charges of aiding the enemy or even treason. Like the
internment of enemy persons and confiscation of enemy property, the
prohibition of commerce is aimed at depriving the enemy of resources
conducive to war.
Arguably, a state of war in which hostilities take place within the United
States eliminates due process rights of any enemy fighter, whether a foreign
invader or a citizen who has taken up arms against the government during a

commission of hostile acts imputed as his intention because they are a duty to his
sovereign.”).
33. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 100a.
34. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942) (holding that an enemy alien was permitted to
bring suit against an American company to claim unpaid wages); 2 OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 100a (explaining that this rule had virtually vanished
by World War I).
35. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775.
36. Silesian Am. Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475 (1947).
37. United States ex rel. De Cicco v. Longo, 46 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1942) (finding
that internees have the right to habeas corpus to assert U.S. citizenship); see Eisentrager, 339
U.S. at 775 (“Courts will entertain [an interned enemy alien’s] plea for freedom from
Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien
enemy and so subject to the Alien Enemy Act.”).
38. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
39. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court upheld a conviction for
violating the exclusion order and did not address the citizen’s right to due process in
connection with relocation or detention. Id.
40. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1943).

2084

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

serious rebellion.41 With the exception of those who are associated with a
foreign or breakaway government at war with the United States,42 the
principle that war replaces civil law with military law has been historically
limited to the actual scene of hostilities and areas that are declared hostile
territory43 (e.g., states that joined the Confederacy during the Civil War)
and does not extend to regions remote from hostilities where the civil
government is not deposed.44
The harsh consequences for wartime enemies may have been ameliorated
in recent years, when the Supreme Court declined to extend the alien enemy
doctrine, as described in Johnson v. Eisentrager,45 to cover suspected
enemy combatants (who are not technically enemy aliens) detained by the
United States in an area subject to its jurisdiction overseas.46 Some lower
courts were willing to permit detention of “enemy combatants” within the
United States, whether citizens47 or aliens,48 without requiring much due
41. WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 513 (1912) (“[I]n war the enemy, be he a foreign one, or a rebel to whom the status
of belligerent has been given, has no legal rights which those opposed to him must
respect.”). Occupying forces in hostile territory are likewise not subject to local civil laws.
Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 165 (1879) (noting that when Union “armies marched into
the country which acknowledged the authority of the Confederate government, that is, into
the enemy’s country, their officers and soldiers were not subject to its laws, nor amenable to
its tribunals for their acts”).
42. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (finding that even enemy belligerents within the
United States, including both enemy aliens and a U.S. citizen, had a right to contest their
status via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
43. See WILLOUGHBY, supra note 41, at 513.
When a civil contest becomes a public war, all persons living within limits
declared to be hostile become ipso facto enemies, and subject to treatment as such.
Different conditions prevail, however, in loyal districts. In these the existence
of war does not operate to destroy or suspend the civil rights of the inhabitants.
Upon the actual scene of war, there is no question that, for the time being, the
military authorities are supreme, and that these may do whatever may be necessary
in order that the military operations which are being pursued may succeed.
Id. (footnote omitted).
44. See id. at 514–15 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)); see also
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121, 139–42 (rejecting the government’s contention that the
president’s determination as to the region of military operations was conclusive); CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at 342 (2004) (“Military law to the exclusion of
constitutional limitations otherwise applicable is the rule in the areas in which military
operations are taking place.”).
45. 339 U.S. 763, 782 (1950) (rejecting the contention that nonresident enemy aliens
engaged in hostilities against the United States were “persons” within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment and had the right to access the courts to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus).
46. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Similarly, an alien designated for sanctions as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” is
able to contest such designation as a violation of due process so long as the alien has
sufficient presence in the United States. See, e.g., Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64
(D.D.C. 2008) (finding that an alien had sufficient contacts to have standing to argue a Fifth
Amendment claim, but the claim was dismissed because the plaintiff had received notice and
an opportunity to be heard).
47. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y.) (rejecting
the notion that a citizen suspected of being an “enemy combatant” was entitled to no due
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process, but the Supreme Court has not validated this view. A Court
plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld rejected the notion that a citizen
captured on the battlefield can be detained without due process,49 while at
the same time suggesting that the process due to such a citizen might fall
short of procedures accorded at a criminal trial.50 Despite the plurality’s
repeated reference to the fact that the petitioner was a U.S. citizen detained
on U.S. soil, lower courts have applied its due process reasoning in cases
process, but finding that due process requires only that the government present “some
evidence” in support of the allegation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The government in that
case sought to deny the petitioner, a U.S. citizen, the ability to meet with counsel in order to
present factual evidence to rebut the allegations. The judge ordered otherwise. From there,
the case took a course that brought it before two circuit courts and the Supreme Court, but it
was never resolved definitively on the merits. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527
(E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that a U.S. citizen captured abroad and held as an “enemy
combatant” is entitled to due process of law, which was not satisfied by a government
declaration standing alone, but suggesting that the declaration was deficient in some respects
and might otherwise have sufficed), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 507
(2004). The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing
was necessary to sustain the government’s authority to detain the citizen under these
circumstances. Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450.
48. See Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006), rev’d en
banc sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.); Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005) (denying summary judgment and distinguishing between citizen
and alien enemy combatants). In Al-Marri ex. rel. Berman v. Wright, the district court held
that the government had satisfied its burden of proving the detainee to be an enemy
combatant by submitting an affidavit based on hearsay. The appellate court, sitting en banc,
was sharply divided, but the controlling opinion remanded the case for a factual
determination using a higher level of due process than had been initially adopted by the
district court or was urged by the government. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the
case was made moot when the government transferred al-Marri to the criminal court system
for prosecution. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066 (2008).
49. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (stating that due process
requires that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker”);
id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
50. Justice O’Connor wrote in Hamdi that the exigencies of the circumstances may
allow for a tailoring of enemy combatant proceedings “to alleviate their uncommon potential
to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict,” possibly allowing hearsay
evidence and “a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence,” as long as a fair
opportunity to rebut such evidence is provided. Id. at 533–34 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality
opinion). Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that Hamdi was entitled to due
process, including the right to counsel, but did not agree with the suggestion that “the
Government could claim an evidentiary presumption casting the burden of rebuttal on
Hamdi, or that an opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal might obviate or truncate
enquiry by a court on habeas.” Id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (citations
omitted). Justices Scalia and Stevens would have found the full trappings of a criminal trial
necessary in the absence of a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and in any event, did
not believe the Court should engage in legislating alternative procedures. Id. at 554, 576
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas alone would have accepted the government’s view
that it need only show “some evidence” in order to establish that detention is warranted,
arguing that the federal government’s war powers cannot be “balanced away by this Court”
and that only Congress should be able to “provide for additional procedural protections.” Id.
at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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involving aliens alleged to be enemy belligerents, both within the United
States and abroad.51
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Many once thought that the Constitution applied only on U.S. territory, at
least the parts of it that set forth the rights of the governed.52 That strictly
territorial understanding has not been static, however, and may yet be
evolving.
Any inquiry into the status of constitutional rights abroad must start with
the Insular Cases,53 in which the Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth
century examined the application of the Constitution on newly acquired
territories and possessions. The crucial distinction was whether the territory
in question was destined to be incorporated as a state in the Union or
whether U.S. sovereignty there was meant to be temporary.54 In the latter
case, the territory was deemed “unincorporated” and only “fundamental”
constitutional rights attached.55 Although the reasoning for the incomplete
attachment of constitutional rights to unincorporated territories had much to
do with what were viewed as the less developed political societies formed
by the native inhabitants of these territories,56 the failure to extend
constitutional rights affected U.S. citizens present in the territories as much
as it did the noncitizen inhabitants.57
Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged on the matter of
the extraterritorial application of the Constitution. According to one view,
the United States is considered a limited government that derives its
existence and all of its powers from the Constitution.58 It would follow that

51. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2741 (2012); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465 (D.D.C.
2005), vacated by Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
52. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (holding that the constitutional right to indictment,
grand jury, or jury trial do not apply to a U.S. citizen tried by a U.S. consular court abroad);
see KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 85 (2009) (describing the legal landscape at the
beginning of the twentieth century as one in which some questioned why “all of the powers,
but only some of the rights” under the Constitution extended to U.S. territories overseas that
were not destined to join the union as a state).
53. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91
(1914); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Rassmussen v. United States, 197
U.S. 516 (1905); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Fourteen Diamond Rings v.
United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v.
New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182
U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182
U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
54. Downes, 182 U.S. at 271.
55. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 144–148; see RAUSTIALA, supra note 52, at 83–86 (describing the
doctrine of incorporation).
56. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 958–62 (1991).
57. Id. at 943.
58. See NEUMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
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the Constitution “follows the flag”; whenever or wherever these powers are
exercised, they are subject to all of the limitations contained in the
Constitution.59 A second school of thought regards the Constitution as a
“social contract” between the government and the governed, in which it is
emphasized that certain rights pertain to “the people” but do not extend
beyond members of the exclusive community.60
A. Citizens Abroad
In 1891, the Supreme Court stated in In re Ross:
By the constitution a government is ordained and established “for the
United States of America,” and not for countries outside of their limits.
The guaranties it affords against accusation of capital or infamous crimes,
except by indictment or presentment by a grand jury, and for an impartial
trial by a jury when thus accused, apply only to citizens and others within
the United States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offenses
committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners
abroad. The constitution can have no operation in another country.61

Thus, up until the World War II era, American citizens could be tried
overseas by a consular or extraterritorial court,62 or, in areas subject to
military occupation, by military tribunal,63 apparently without the ordinary
constitutional provisions guaranteed in criminal trials.64

59. The four dissenting justices in the Downes v. Bidwell case, the first of the Insular
Cases, took this view. Downes, 182 U.S. at 358 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
60. See Neuman, supra note 56, at 913.
61. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (citation omitted). The writ of habeas corpus
was nevertheless available, and the case was not one in which a person was punished without
any process at all. Id.
62. The United States created extraterritorial courts through treaties with trade partners,
who were regarded as having less civilized legal systems, in order to gain access to foreign
societies without subjecting American traders to the risk of what were perceived as barbaric
and unfair trials. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 52, at 20–21. Although the consular courts
were for the most part disbanded by the time the U.S. District Court for China was
established in 1906, that court continued to consider Ross controlling as to the constitutional
rights that defendants could assert before it. Id. at 68–71. The U.S. District Court for China
was abolished in 1943 pursuant to a treaty with China. Treaty and an Accompanying
Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and China Respecting the
Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters,
U.S.-China, art. 1, Jan. 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 767. The United States finally relinquished all
claims to consular jurisdiction in 1956, by which time the consulate in Morocco was the only
one that continued to exercise consular jurisdiction over Americans. Joint Resolution
Approving the Relinquishments of the Consular Jurisdiction of the United States in
Morocco, U.S.-Morocco, Aug. 1, 1956, 70 Stat. 773.
63. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
64. Id. at 359, 360 n.26 (describing due process protections in occupation courts,
suggesting that the Fifth Amendment’s inapplicability to cases arising in the land or naval
forces led to a difference in protections); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901) (finding
that a U.S. citizen to be tried in Cuba under U.S. military occupation was not entitled to
“fundamental guaranties of life, liberty, and property embodied in [the Constitution] . . .
[because] those provisions have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of
the United States against the laws of a foreign country,” although that foreign country was
under U.S. military occupation at the time).

2088

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

A series of Supreme Court cases in the 1950s cast considerable doubt on
that proposition, although the Court did not expressly overrule the line of
cases supporting it.65 In Reid v. Covert,66 the Court reversed its own
opinions from the previous term67 and overturned the convictions of two
civilian wives of military officers who were tried by military tribunals
overseas for their husbands’ murders. Justice Black wrote for himself and
three others:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority
have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land.68

The opinion established that civilians could not be tried for capital crimes
without the full panoply of due process standards guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, at least outside of areas of ongoing military operations or
occupation.69 The holding was soon expanded to cover noncapital cases
and crimes involving civilian employees of the armed services.70 Due

65. In Reid v. Covert, Justice Black, writing for a plurality, considered Ross to be “one
of those cases that cannot be understood except in its peculiar setting; even then, it seems
highly unlikely that a similar result would be reached today.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10
(1957) (Black, J.) (plurality opinion). He distinguished Madsen on the basis that it
“concerned trials in enemy territory which had been conquered and held by force of arms
and which was being governed at the time by our military forces. In such areas, the Army
commander can establish military or civilian commissions as an arm of the occupation to try
everyone in the occupied area, whether they are connected with the Army or not.” Id. at 35
n.63. Justice Black also suggested that “neither the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning
should be given any further expansion.” Id. at 14.
66. 354 U.S. 1.
67. Id. at 5 (withdrawing opinions in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid
v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956)). Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the result.
Justice Harlan described the reasoning in those two cases as holding that the government’s
choice of court-martial to try the women satisfied due process because it was “reasonable” in
light of their connection with the military. Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 5–6 (Black, J.) (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 35 n.63 (distinguishing Madsen based on the circumstances of military
occupation). Reid invalidated Article 2(a)(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012), which brought under the purview of
military jurisdiction civilians accompanying the armed forces outside of the United States or
its territories subject to treaty with the host country. Article 2(10) of the UCMJ covers
“persons serving with or accompanying” the armed forces in the field “in time of declared
war or a contingency operation.” 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10). This provision remains good law,
although the reasoning in Reid may call it into question, at least with respect to citizens. See
United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (finding that an alien contractor working
for the U.S. government was not entitled to avoid a military trial under the Fifth
Amendment), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (2013).
70. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (extending Reid to
prohibit court martial of a civilian employee of the Army for a noncapital offense); Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (extending Reid to prohibit court martial of a civilian
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process rights under the Fifth Amendment clearly now seem applicable to
U.S. citizens abroad.71
B. Aliens Abroad
Based on Supreme Court statements suggesting that aliens gain
constitutional rights upon entering the country and thereafter forming a link
with the community, one might conclude that aliens abroad enjoy no
constitutional protections. Yet the Supreme Court has never squarely
affirmed that this is the case.72 In at least one sense, foreign nationals with
no connection to the United States are protected by due process; they
cannot be subject to lawsuits in a state in which they have not formed
“minimum contacts” by purposefully directing activity toward it.73 There
may be due process implications when the United States asserts jurisdiction
over aliens for conduct abroad that has little or no effect on the United
States.74 It has never been held that aliens brought involuntarily to the
United States for criminal trial may be denied due process of law because of
their lack of positive connections with the United States. In one case
involving an alien tried by a U.S. court in Berlin, the defendant was held to
be entitled to a jury trial and other constitutional rights.75 Aliens not
subjected to the U.S. judicial system involuntarily, however, have had little
success bringing suit against the United States for injuries suffered
overseas.76
employee of the Army for a capital offense); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960) (applying Reid to a noncapital case involving a civilian dependent).
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 721 cmt. b (1987) (“The Constitution governs the exercise of authority by the United
States government over United States citizens outside United States territory, for example on
the high seas, and even on foreign soil.”). U.S. citizens are not, however, protected from
being transferred to a foreign government for trial, even if that government does not apply
the same procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674 (2008); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
72. But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784
(1950)); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (“Indeed, we have rejected the claim that aliens
are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.”).
73. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires due process on the part of
states, is violated by a state court asserting jurisdiction over a foreign defendant lacking
minimum contacts with the forum state). Arguably, the due process right at issue applies at
trial in the United States and does not actually extend abroad. RAUSTIALA, supra note 52, at
245–46.
74. See infra Part IV; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2012).
75. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
76. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.D.C. 1976)
(citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776, among other cases) (stating the general rule that aliens
have no standing to sue in U.S. courts and naming three exceptions). A later ruling by the
D.C. Circuit called this decision into question. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11,
65–68 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated by 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating in light of
intervening case law on the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Statute from Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)); see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v.
United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that the owners of a chemical plant
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In Johnson v. Eisentrager,77 the Supreme Court addressed whether alien
enemies captured abroad and held in U.S.-occupied territory overseas could
challenge their convictions by military commission. Reversing the
appellate court below, the Court held that “the Constitution does not confer
a right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and
punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a
government at war with the United States.”78 In so holding, the Court
rejected the lower court’s extension of constitutional protections to
nonresident alien enemies that were denied to resident alien enemies,79 and
remarked:
If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world except
Americans engaged in defending it, the same must be true of the
companion civil-rights Amendments, for none of them is limited by its
express terms, territorially or as to persons. Such a construction would
mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements,
guerrilla fighters, and “werewolves” could require the American Judiciary
to assure them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First
Amendment, right to bear arms as in the Second, security against
“unreasonable” searches and seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to
jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.80

Still, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reid less than a decade later
seemed to reject the strictly territorial theory of the Constitution in favor of
one in which executive branch officials operate under constitutional
restraints even when operating overseas. Although the justices were careful
to limit their opinions to action taken against U.S. citizens abroad, none
endeavored to clarify why U.S. officials should operate under fewer
constitutional restraints with respect to aliens. Some lower courts have
applied the Reid reasoning to cases involving aliens abroad,81 construing
Eisentrager as limited to wartime enemies.82

destroyed due to a suspected connection with a terrorist organization were barred from
seeking compensation by the political question doctrine); Atamirzayeva v. United States,
524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that an Uzbek citizen whose cafeteria was destroyed
at the behest of the U.S. government lacked significant ties to the United States and thus had
no standing to bring a case under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
77. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
78. Id. at 785.
79. Id. at 784.
80. Id.
81. See Cadenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that an alien overseas
was entitled to challenge governmental interference with her property); United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that an alien had standing to bring
constitutional claims with respect to U.S. government conduct abroad), abrogated by United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
82. See, e.g., Cadenas, 733 F.2d at 915 (“It is beyond peradventure that a foreign
nonresident, non-hostile alien may, under some circumstances, enjoy the benefits of certain
constitutional limitations imposed on United States actions.”).
The D.C. Circuit
distinguished Eisentrager as having to do with “rights of aliens during periods of war
involv[ing] considerations not present here.” Id. at 916.
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Pointing in the opposite direction is the 1990 case United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez,83 in which the Supreme Court addressed the Fourth
Amendment rights of aliens abroad. In determining that such rights do not
apply to aliens lacking significant ties to the United States for searches or
seizures that take place abroad (even if the alien himself is present within
the United States), the majority distinguished between Fourth Amendment
rights, which apply to “the people,” and other amendments that apply to
“persons,” like the Fifth Amendment.84 Chief Justice Rehnquist applied a
social contract theory to reason that the “the people” refers to “a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of
that community.”85 At the same time, the majority suggested that Fifth
Amendment rights do not apply to aliens extraterritorially.86 Although he
joined the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy appeared to disagree with the
view that aliens abroad are necessarily denied due process rights, pointing
out that aliens subject to trial in the United States are entitled to due
process, even if they were brought from overseas involuntarily.87 In
dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the defendant should be entitled to the
Fourth Amendment protections because of involuntary ties, as the
government sought to hold him accountable under U.S. law.88
In the 2008 case Boumediene v. Bush,89 the Court ruled, in a five-to-four
opinion, that the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus extends to those
detained at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility.90 In so holding, the
83. 494 U.S. 259.
84. Id. at 265.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 268–71 (describing Eisentrager as having rejected “the claim that aliens are
entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States”).
87. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I do not mean to imply, and the Court has not
decided, that [aliens brought from overseas to stand trial] have no constitutional protection.
The United States is prosecuting a foreign national in a court established under Article III,
and all of the trial proceedings are governed by the Constitution. All would agree, for
instance, that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the
defendant.”). The majority distinguished the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination as a trial right, while a Fourth Amendment violation occurs at the scene of an
unreasonable search or seizure. Id. at 264 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
88. Id. at 284–85 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (emphasizing mutuality of
obligations as essential to fairness). Justice Brennan further noted that:
The “sufficient connection” is supplied not by Verdugo-Urquidez, but by the
Government. Respondent is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment
because our Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold him
accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a member of our
community for purposes of enforcing our laws. He has become, quite literally, one
of the governed. Fundamental fairness and the ideals underlying our Bill of Rights
compel the conclusion that when we impose “societal obligations,” such as the
obligation to comply with our criminal laws, on foreign nationals, we in turn are
obliged to respect certain correlative rights, among them the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 283–84 (citations omitted); see also id. at 297–98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with Justice Brennan’s dissent, but disassociating from that opinion insofar as it applied to a
broader context beyond the exercise of sovereign authority over aliens).
89. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
90. Id. at 732.
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Court stated that the Constitution’s extraterritorial application turns on
“objective factors and practical concerns.”91 These practical considerations
were seen as a common thread weaving from the Insular Cases, through
Ross, to Eisentrager and Reid.92 The Court rejected the government’s
formalist interpretation of Eisentrager under which the question of habeas
jurisdiction was said to turn on whether the detainees were held in a
territory over which the United States was sovereign.93 It was enough that
the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control over the naval
base.
The Court deemed at least three factors relevant in assessing the
extraterritorial scope of the constitutional writ of habeas: (1) the citizenship
and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the status determination
process; (2) the nature of the site where the person is seized and detained;
and (3) practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to
the writ.94 Although the Court did not clarify which constitutional rights
other than the privilege of habeas corpus would extend to the detainees, the
first factor suggests that at least some aliens detained abroad have due
process rights.95 Otherwise, they would have no right to a status
determination process in the first place.96
Lower courts have interpreted the above cases as affording constitutional
due process rights to aliens abroad only to the extent that they have formed
sufficient positive ties with the United States.97 The D.C. Circuit has
91. Id. at 764.
92. Id. at 756–64. The majority was also troubled by the separation-of-powers
implications that the government’s approach created, which it said would mean “that by
surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at
the same time entering into a lease that grants total control over the territory back to the
United States, it would be possible for the political branches to govern without legal
constraint.” Id. at 765.
93. Guantánamo Bay is held by the United States under a lease between the United
States and Cuba, which states “Cuba retains ‘ultimate sovereignty’ over the territory while
the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control.’” Id. at 753 (quoting Lease of
Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, Art. III, T.S. No. 418).
94. Id. at 766.
95. Cf. id. at 781 (“The idea that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends
upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our test for procedural adequacy in
the due process context.”); id. at 785 (“Although we make no judgment whether the
[procedures used at Guantánamo to ascertain the status of detainees], satisfy due process
standards, we agree . . . that, even when all the parties involved in this process act with
diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of
fact.”).
96. But see Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that detainees at a
U.S.-controlled prison in a war zone were not entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
notwithstanding the fact that procedures for establishing belligerent status fell short of those
found insufficient in Boumediene).
97. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that an alien who voluntarily departed from the United States with the intention to return to
continue her studies had developed sufficient ties to the country to assert a due process
violation against the government agency that prevented her return by placing her name on a
“no-fly” list); Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that
an alien with no substantial connection to the United States has no right to assert a Fifth
Amendment takings claim for property destroyed overseas); Hoffmann v. United States, 17

2014]

U.S. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN NATIONALS

2093

maintained that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to aliens or foreign
entities without presence or property in the United States,98 unless the alien
or entity is forced to defend itself in a U.S. court.99 At least one appellate
court has suggested that Boumediene may apply a functional approach to all
cases in which an alien asserts an extraterritorial constitutional violation,
including alleged violations of the Due Process Clause,100 while others have
limited Boumediene’s application to the Suspension Clause.101
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW
Early in U.S. history, criminal laws were, for the most part, territorial.102
Criminal laws applied to conduct taking place, at least in part, in the
territory of the United States or having some territorial effect. A
presumption remains against extraterritoriality for criminal laws in cases
where Congress does not express its intent,103 but a surprising number of
F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that a foreign national who failed to establish
substantial connections to the United States could not maintain takings claim against the
United States for failure to return artwork taken from Germany during the allied occupation
after World War II).
98. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment has not been clearly established as prohibiting torture of aliens detained by the
United States during hostilities overseas, resulting in qualified immunity for alleged
torturers); Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (determining that
noncitizen detainees wrongfully held at Guantánamo lacked significant ties to the United
States and were not protected by the Due Process Clause), vacated and remanded per
curiam, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), reinstated as modified per curiam, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that Guantánamo
detainees are not entitled to Fifth Amendment protections); 32 Cnty. Sovereignty Comm. v.
Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that a foreign entity wishing to
challenge its designation as a “foreign terrorist organization” is not entitled to due process
rights); Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that a Guatemalan
citizen allegedly tortured and murdered by CIA affiliates abroad was not entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403
(2002); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (“A foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional
rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.”).
99. GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[S]ince [the
foreign corporation] has been forced to appear in the United States, at least for that limited
purpose, it is entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause.” (footnote omitted)).
100. Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 997 (rejecting the government’s proposed “bright-line ‘formal
sovereignty-based test’” under which “any alien, no matter how great her voluntary
connection with the United States, immediately loses all constitutional rights as soon as she
voluntarily leaves the country”).
101. El Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 848–49 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(distinguishing the Suspension Clause from others in that it describes a role for the
judiciary); Rasul, 563 F.3d at 531; Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546 (2010) (finding that
Boumediene does not apply to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause).
102. United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 16,317)
(“Except in [certain cases where Congress has provided for jurisdiction in foreign territory],
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States is necessarily limited to their own territory,
actual or constructive.”); cf. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909)
(“The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”).
103. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“It is a
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
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criminal statutes now expressly extend to conduct overseas.104 The
presumption may also be overcome if the nature and purpose of a statute
indicate that Congress intended it to apply outside of the United States.105
At first, the extension of criminal jurisdiction overseas was largely
limited to the conduct of citizens abroad under the “nationality” principle of
jurisdiction under international law, the constitutionality of which was
never in doubt.106 Increasingly, however, jurisdiction over conduct
overseas has found additional support through the principles of “passive
personality” and “protection,” where the victim is a national of the United
States or the crime affects U.S. national interests, respectively, even though
the perpetrator may be a foreign national. The “universality principle”
permits extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenses that are considered to
affect all nations, such as piracy. In some instances, consistent with our
treaty obligations, jurisdiction may be founded solely on the fact that a
suspect is later found or brought into the territorial jurisdiction of U.S.
courts, without the crime necessarily having any connection to or effect in
the United States.107
Under the United States’ view of the international legal requirements, the
exercise of jurisdiction over an offense that occurs in the territory of another
state must be “reasonable.”108 The most commonly invoked constitutional
ground for determining the validity of an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the criminal context, however, is the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. A small number of defendants have succeeded in

appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ This
principle represents a canon of construction, or a presumption about a statute’s meaning,
rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
104. See Doyle, supra note 74 (cataloging criminal statutes with extraterritorial
application).
105. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
106. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (“With respect to such an
exercise of authority, there is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the
municipal law which establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to his own government.
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the question of its
application, so far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are concerned, is one
of construction, not of legislative power.” (footnotes omitted)).
107. Some crimes related to terrorism fall into this category. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32
(2012) (stating that the willful destruction of registered U.S. aircraft in foreign territory is
subject to U.S. jurisdiction); id. § 831 (stating that a foreign transaction of nuclear materials
implicating U.S. interests is subject to U.S. jurisdiction); id. § 1203 (stating that taking U.S.
nationals hostage in a foreign country creates U.S. jurisdiction).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(1) (1987) (“[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.”). Other states may take a different view. See Dan E. Stigall,
International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S.
Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 342 (2012) (noting that the
“reasonableness” test seems to be “almost exclusively a creature of U.S. antitrust
jurisprudence”).
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having their cases dismissed on this basis,109 or because statutes are
interpreted, under the Charming Betsy doctrine,110 in such a way as to
comply with international law.111 On the other hand, where Congress has
explicitly provided for extraterritorial application of criminal statutes,
courts do not question whether such provisions exceed any standard under
international law.112
Some of the circuit courts have developed varying tests for determining
when an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction violates due process. The
Ninth Circuit requires a nexus between the United States and the
circumstances of the offense,113 without which a prosecution may be
deemed arbitrary or unfair.114 No such nexus requirement need be met,
however, if the offenders were arrested on a stateless vessel on the high
seas, apparently due to the absence of comity issues with other sovereigns
and the notion that those sailing on flagless ships have forfeited protections
under international law.115 The nexus requirement is also vitiated where a

109. See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2006).
110. Under the Charming Betsy doctrine, Congress is presumed to intend its legislation to
comply with international law unless its intent to act otherwise is clear. Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. . . .”).
111. United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing
conspiracy to commit piracy charge as unfounded under international law defining universal
jurisdiction), aff’d in part, 718 F.3d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
112. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Yunis, 924
F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[The defendant] seeks to portray international law as a
self-executing code that trumps domestic law whenever the two conflict. That effort
misconceives the role of judges as appliers of international law and as participants in the
federal system. Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States, not to conform the law of the land to norms of customary international law.”).
113. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987) (“There was substantial
evidence that the drugs were bound ultimately for the United States. Where an attempted
transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States, there is a sufficient
basis for the United States to exercise its jurisdiction to arrest and try the offenders.”).
114. United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘In order to apply
extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there
must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’” (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at
112)); Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1160-61; United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 828
(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]o satisfy
the strictures of due process, the Government [must] demonstrate that there exists ‘a
sufficient nexus between the conduct condemned and the United States such that the
application of the statute [to the conduct of an alien committed abroad] would not be
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair to the defendant.’” (quoting United States v. Medjuck, 48
F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995))); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir.
1990).
115. United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]here a
defendant attempts to avoid the law of all nations by travelling on a stateless vessel, he has
forfeited these protections of international law and can be charged with the knowledge that
he has done so.”).
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treaty obligates the United States to prosecute certain crimes,116 even if the
alien defendant is from a nation not party to that treaty.117
The Second Circuit has also adopted an approach reliant on a
determination of the nexus of an offense to the United States, which is
found whenever the activity in question is aimed at causing harm within its
territory.118 The Fourth Circuit has followed suit.119 The nexus test is said
to perform the same function that the minimum contacts test serves in civil
litigation—that is, to determine whether a defendant should “reasonably
anticipate being haled into court” in the United States.120
Other circuits have rejected the nexus requirement and analyzed
jurisdiction based on “fundamental fairness.”121 Some courts have
determined fundamental fairness by inquiring whether an exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction comports with international law principles.122
Others apparently find dispositive the possibility that a prosecution might
impinge on the interests of a foreign state.123 In these courts, competing
state interests apparently trump any analysis of individual rights when it
comes to weighing fundamental fairness.

116. United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723 (9th Cir. 2008).
117. United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (construing Shi as holding
that an international convention provides global notice that certain generally condemned acts
are subject to prosecution by any party to the treaty and that due process requires no more).
118. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118 (“When Congress so intends, we apply a statute
extraterritorially as long as doing so does not violate due process. ‘In order to apply
extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there
must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’ For non-citizens acting entirely
abroad, a jurisdictional nexus exists when the aim of that activity is to cause harm inside the
United States or to U.S. citizens or interests.” (quoting Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86)); Yousef, 327
F.3d at 111–12.
119. United States v. Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App’x 259 (4th Cir. 2009).
120. United States v. Klimavicius–Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the
sufficient nexus requirement); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir.
2002) (finding that where conduct occurred on the high seas and the flag nation consents to
jurisdiction, “no due process violation occurs in an extraterritorial prosecution under [the
criminal statute] when there is no nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the United
States”); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (“To satisfy due
process, our application of the [criminal statute] must not be arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair.”); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting
the sufficient nexus test and noting that there was “nothing fundamentally unfair” about the
defendant’s prosecution).
122. See United States v. Ibaruen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (11th Cir. 2011)
(finding that the exercise of jurisdiction over a stateless vessel did not offend international
principles and therefore comported with due process); Stigall, supra note 108, at 361 (citing
Cardales, 168 F.3d 548).
123. See Stigall, supra note 108, at 367 (describing the practice of the Third Circuit in
Martinez-Hidalgo and Perez-Oviedo).
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CONCLUSION
As the courts inevitably confront more foreign defendants caught in the
web of antiterrorism laws, challenges to jurisdiction on due process grounds
will likely swell. The Supreme Court has yet to review the doctrinal
paradox that the Due Process Clause seems to provide the greatest
protection to persons who are said to enjoy the fewest due process
protections.124 Perhaps the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to reassess
its approach in this regard.
The Court has recently renewed its commitment to the presumption
against extraterritoriality,125 while also embracing a more pragmatic
approach to determining how the Constitution applies abroad.126 A return
to historical considerations based on international law conceptions of the
meaning of citizenship might serve to satisfy both the formalist and
functionalist sides of the debate.
This approach would reconnect the lost link between allegiance and
protection that remained perceptible until the second half of the last century.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over an alien would be presumed reasonable in
the case of conduct that breaches an obligation on the part of the alien or his
state of nationality. Such an obligation could arise from treaty or from the
general obligation to refrain from injuring another sovereign or its
nationals. Most cases in which a sufficient nexus can be established under
the current approach of some circuits would likely satisfy this requirement.
Crimes that are subject to universal jurisdiction would continue to apply
universally. On the other hand, if the statute in question is more akin to a
prohibition on trading with the enemy—in other words, where the
government mobilizes the people to support its foreign policy—foreigners
outside the United States would not be expected to pitch in. Under this
view, sanctions laws would only apply to those persons within the United
States and to those persons abroad who purposefully avail themselves of
U.S. markets. This would not necessarily lessen the effectiveness of U.S.
sanctions policies; it would merely sharpen the distinction between the
targets of sanctions and those obliged to assist the United States in carrying
them out. In the case of actual hostilities, enemy individuals would not be
expected to act as if in allegiance to the United States, but would be subject
to greatly reduced due process in the event of a deprivation of liberty
interest, albeit in accordance with the protections of international law.

124. A number of commentators have criticized this development. See, e.g., Anthony J.
Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the
Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121 (2007); A. Mark
Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 379 (1997).
125. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
126. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

